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Abstract: 
This article analyses the political stakes of the EU’s communication policy. The authors 
study  the  frictions  between  European  institutions,  mainly  the  Commission  and 
Parliament,  after  the  publication  of  the  White  Paper  on  a  European  Communication 
Policy, replacing them in the context of the representations, routines, and compromises 
that have historically structured the interinstitutional relationships about communication. 
This historical perspective enables them to show the long lasting and persistent attention 
of the European actors to the promotion of Europe, as well as the strength of logics of 
compromise on the politicisation of European communication.   
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Résumé : 
Cet article analyse les enjeux politiques qui traversent aujourd’hui l’Union européenne 
concernant sa politique  de communication.  Les  auteurs étudient  les  frictions qui ont 
opposé les institutions européennes, principalement la Commission et le Parlement,  à 
l’occasion  de  la  publication  du  Livre  blanc  sur  une  politique  de  communication 
européenne, en les replaçant  plus largement dans les  représentations, les routines et les 
compromis qui structurent historiquement les relations interinstitutionnelles autour de la 
communication.  Cette  perspective  historique  leur  permet  de  montrer  non  seulement 
l’antériorité et la persistance du souci des acteurs européens à promouvoir l’Europe, mais 
aussi  la  force  des  logiques  de  compromis  sur  la  politisation  de  la  communication 
européenne. 
 
Mots-clés : Communication européenne, UE, Livre blanc, Espace public européen.  
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“Public  relations  are  an  independent 
complement  of  the  general  information 
activity. It is clear that they both deserve 
maximum  attention  from  both  the 
European Commission and the European 
Parliament  in  the  absence  of  which  the 
Communities  would  exist  exclusively  at 
the  intergovernmental  level  and  end  up 
speaking a language understood only by a 
small group of insiders; a ‘volapük’ for 
stateless  technocrats  and  not  a  human 
language” 
 
~European Parliament Political 
Committee report on the information 
policy of European Communities 
(January 1972). 
 
 
If the Union wishes to be listened to, it 
has to take European affairs to national, 
regional, and local level. However, it is 
not sensible to view citizens as the prime 
movers  of  participation and dialogue.  It 
would  be  pointless  to  listen  carefully  to 
what citizens had to say if they were ill-
informed. 
 
~Report of the Committee on 
Culture and Education of the European 
Parliament on the White Paper on a 
European communication policy (October 
2006). 
 
Published  at  the  height  of  the  crisis 
triggered  in  the  spring  of  2005  by  the 
rejection  of  the  constitutional  treaty  in 
France  and  the  Netherlands,  the  recent 
White Paper issued by the Commission 
on European Union communication
1  
gave rise to surprisingly bitter exchanges 
between  the  institutions  of  the  Union, 
quite  unlike  the  “culture  of  consensus” 
that  is  usually  associated  with 
Community  institutions  (Abélès/Bellier 
1996). Although the Commission issues 
numerous  White  Papers,  they  hardly 
have  anything  in  common.  Unlike  the 
very  first  of  its  kind
2  issued  by  the 
Commission  which  made  a  triumphant 
début,  the  political  outcome  of  this 
White  Paper  was  less  glorious. 
Immediately  after  its  publication,  the 
proposals of the Commission contained 
therein  rekindled  the  enduring 
controversy  over  the  objectives  and 
means  of  European  Community 
                                                 
1  European  Commission,  White  Paper  on  a 
European  communication  policy,  Luxembourg, 
OPCE,  2006  [COM  (2006)  35  final].  The 
Commission  specifies  on  its  site  that  “White 
papers  are  documents  containing  proposals  for 
Community  action  in  a  specific  area.  They 
sometimes  follow  a  green  paper  published  to 
launch a consultation process at European level. 
While  green  papers  set  out  a  range  of  ideas 
presented for public discussion and debate, white 
papers  contain  an  official  set  of  proposals  in 
specific policy areas and are used as vehicles for 
their development.” 
2  Concerning  the  first  White  Paper  on  the 
economic and monetary union, see Drake 2002. 
For a personal account, refer to the chapter titled 
“Le livre blanc de 1993 ou la dernière chance” in 
Jacques Delors’s Mémoires (p. 416sq).  
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communication.
3  However,  the  issue 
went beyond the endless debate over the 
technical  diagnostic  of  the  problem 
which  had  raged  back  and  forth  for 
nearly  two  decades.  This  time  around, 
the  major  institutions  of  the  Union  not 
only disagreed sharply but also disagreed 
publicly.  If  the  inter-institutional 
disagreement alternately took on aspects 
of  the  quarrel  over  “good  law” 
(concerning  the  “legal  basis”  of  the 
communication  policy),  of  the  experts’ 
debate over the proper means and of the 
political  argument  over  the  proper 
message,  it  also  drifted  into  trivial 
bargaining  over  the  distribution  of 
resources  allocated  to  European 
communication.  The  controversy  over 
the  common  communication  policy, 
which resurfaced between the summer of 
2005 and autumn 2007, brought into the 
open the remarkable extent to which the 
report  was  dramatised  in  Community 
circles. Additionally, it showed that the 
explosive  disavowal  of  the  draft 
constitution  (the  2005  “no”  vote) 
happened  before  the  cycle  of 
institutional  re-balancing  triggered  by 
the  resignation  of  the  Santer 
Commission  could  be  completed  and, 
also,  before  the  Commission  could  re-
establish  its  leadership  over  issues  that 
traditionally  fell  within  its  jurisdiction. 
Having  hosted  since  its  creation  the 
European  common  information  service, 
which has since become an integral part 
of  its  administration  (the  Directorate-
                                                 
3  As  early  as  the  tortuous  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Maastricht,  the  media  observed  that 
accusing  fingers  were  pointed  at  the 
communications  department  in  community 
circles.  An  article  titled  Espace  européen:  les 
mal-aimés de Bruxelles (the European Zone: the 
unpopular figures of Brussels) published in the 
13  October  1992  issue  of  the  newspaper  Le 
Monde  reads:  “There  was  near-unanimous 
criticism  of  the  DG-X,  a  major  publisher  of 
brochures extolling the virtues of the Community 
which were generously distributed to visitors but 
whose impact on the masses was very limited”. 
General of Information, see below), the 
Commission  has  in  effect  traditionally 
played the roles of initiator, coordinator 
and  manager  of  Community 
communication  within  the  European 
institutional game, deploying its human 
and financial resources in the service of 
European politicians and their “partners” 
(mainly  the  European  Parliament). 
However, the proposals advanced by the 
Commission in the White Paper, which 
seeks to replace routines with functional 
arrangements,
4  drew  opposition  from 
MEPs
5  and  drew  the  attention  of 
representatives of governmental interests 
(COREPER,  General  Secretariat  of  the 
Council). The direction and scope of the 
Commission’s  proposals  following  the 
cycle  of  reactions  from  the  major 
institutional  partners
6  are  a  step 
backwards in this regard, since they were 
aimed  more  at  consolidating  the  well-
oiled practices among the said partners 
than  formally  defining  new  ones.  The 
nature of the bargain around the White 
Paper and, in the long run, the fact that 
the  Commission  abandoned  its  major 
proposals is therefore indicative of a new 
balance  of  power  within  the  European 
institutional game. 
 
It  is  therefore  evident  that  what 
happened  between  June  2005  and 
October  2007  can  be  better  understood 
by  retracing  the  communication  policy 
design component of EU history. Indeed, 
it  is  a  long  way  from  the  initial 
                                                 
4 In the White Paper, the Commission proposed 
to  define  a  legal  base  for  the  communication 
policy  of  the  EU  and  to  formally  declare  it  a 
common policy (see below). 
5 In many respects, the Herrero report ratified by 
the  Parliament  in  October  2006  marks  the 
rejection of the WPC by MEPs. 
6 In accordance with tradition, the answers to the 
White  Paper  by  the  institutions  (Parliament, 
Council)  and  the  organs  (CESE,  regional 
committees)  resulted  in  the  Commission 
publishing  new  follow-up  proposals  early 
October, 2007 (see below).  
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structuring  of  administrative  services 
devolved  to  information  and  press 
relations, to the appointment of Margot 
Wallström  as  vice-president  of  the 
Commission  in  charge  of  “inter-
institutional  relations  and 
communication strategy”. Over the past 
forty  years,  the  project  of  constructing 
Europe has changed in scale and nature. 
Meanwhile, communication has become 
a  major  stake  on  which  the  foremost 
responsibility  of  battling  abstention 
during  European  elections  hinges, 
legitimising EU policy and enhancing its 
image in the public opinions of member 
countries.  The  bitterness  of  inter-
institutional  exchanges  is  first  and 
foremost due to the paradigm shift on the 
problem  of  communication  within 
Community circles. This problem is no 
longer  considered  in  terms  of 
communication  by  “teaching  Europe”, 
but  more  as  the  obligation  to  urgently 
and efficiently generate (mass) support, 
(citizen)  consent  and  (electoral) 
participation at the same time. The issue 
of  the  debate  initiated  between  Union 
institutions  by  the  White  Paper  is 
therefore nothing less than a dismantling 
of  the  orientation  and  the  control  of 
Community  communication  means, 
which  appear  today  as  the  main 
instrument  of  legitimising  a  peculiar 
power,  devoid  of  the  traditional 
attributes  of  political  incarnation  (its 
own  territory,  a  single  decision-making 
centre, administrative machinery or deep 
electoral roots at the local level).
7  It is 
this  chronic  politicisation  of  European 
communication  -  thwarted  and 
euphemised  by  institutional  economics 
and  its  relational  routines  -  which 
revealed  the  process  of  institutional 
                                                 
7  On  the  legitimity  of  the  EU,  see 
Banchoff/Smith  1999.  This  analysis  of  the 
“European power”, in point of fact, echoes the 
theorist  view  of  democracy.  On  these  two 
dimensions  –  social  and  procedural  –  of 
legitimity, see de Búrca 1996. 
exchanges caused by the publication of 
the White Paper.  
 
By  revisiting  the  genesis  of  the  unrest 
the  White  Paper  caused  in  the 
institutional game, this article intends to 
move  away  from  the  traditional 
normative  approach  (Why  does  Europe 
communicate so poorly and how can it 
be improved?)
8 in order to examine how 
the issue of “European communication” 
gradually  evolved  from  a  sectoral  and 
marginal  situation  to  an  inter-sectoral 
and  important  issue.  Like  other  cases 
caught in the interpenetrated geometries 
of  Community  power,  communication 
has  always  been  the  subject  of 
accommodation  between  the  competing 
logics of the institutions and the political 
constraints  of  compromise.  Therefore, 
this  article  will  demonstrate  that  the 
paradigmatic  frameworks
9  of  this 
arrangement are still being fashioned and 
modified to suit the configurations of the 
internal and external power game of the 
Union.
10 
                                                 
8  A  critical  evaluation  of  the  communication 
strategy of the EU inspired several works. From 
the social sciences point of view, see Dacheux 
1997 ;  2003.  Reflexive  accounts  of  European 
institution actors engaged in EU communication 
can be found in CEES 2007.  
9  By  “paradigmatic  framework”,  we  mean 
orders  of  signification,  certainties,  concepts 
that constitute the “culture” of European actors. 
The approach is not psychological, but merely 
aims  (P.  Veyne,  N.  Elias)  to  identify  the 
imaginary  “frames”  which  guide  organised 
action and are apparent in the lines of action 
(“policies”,  “strategy”,  “action plan”) and the 
spaces  of  justifications  that  collective  actors 
apply to themselves and demonstrate publicly. 
Furthermore,  “frame  perspective”  considers 
how  these  frames  play  a  role  in  forecasting, 
diagnosing  and  justifying  common  principles 
of  action.  Concerning  these  roles,  see 
Benford/Snow 2000. 
10  This  article  draws  from  two  main  sources: 
firstly, a systematic prospecting in the archives 
of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament;  secondly,  interviews  conducted  in 
Brussels, Strasbourg, Paris and Berlin  with  the 
protagonists of the EU communication policy.  
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 (1) Teaching Europe as 
communication common sense: 
The avatars of the diffusionist 
paradigm 
  
The  progressive  extension  of  the 
domains  of  intervention  of 
Community communication  
 
The  actors  who  manage  the 
Commission,  i.e.,  the  college  of 
commissioners and senior European civil 
servants, who traditionally speak in the 
name  of  “Europe”,  quickly  showed  the 
importance they attach to the supply of 
information  to  the  public  in  Member 
States.  Traditionally  governed  by  the 
communicational  practices  of  the  day, 
the  communication  policy  of  the 
Commission  initially  drew  from  the 
time-tested techniques of public relations 
and  press  relations.
11  Mass 
communication  practices  were  however 
incorporated into the package in the late 
1980s.  Initially,  media  visibility  of 
Community  institutions  and  their 
activities  seem  to  have  dominated  the 
issue  of  the  relationship  with  public 
opinion.  As  early  as  1950,  Brussels 
hosted  press  and  information 
departments  which  sponsored  the  early 
opinion  polls  on  attitudes  towards  the 
Europe of Six in the founding states. The 
intention  at  the  time  was  to  establish 
contacts  within  two  circles:  the  media; 
and what was then referred to as “return 
information”, which consisted of media 
monitoring  and  opinion  surveys.  Over 
the  years,  these  units  matured  together 
with  the  Commission,  thus  extending 
both  the  scope  and  the  means  of  its 
action.  Although  the  Single  European 
                                                 
11  Regarding  the  creation  of  a  common 
information and spokesperson service, see Rabier 
1993; as well as Bastin 2003.  
Act  boosted  the  integration  process  at 
the  level  of  state-to-state  and 
Commission-state  relations,  it  also 
strengthened  the  influence  of  the 
Commission  within  the  Community 
institutional game. 
 
This  rise  in  the  power  of  the 
Commission resulted in the creation of a 
reactive  and  efficient  communication 
machinery, notably for opinion studies
12, 
media  monitoring  and  campaigns 
directed  at  the  general  public.  Thus  in 
the  late  1980s,  the  Commission  either 
organised or supported several events in 
the  area  of  sports  (European  Sailing 
Championship,  CE  Future  Tour, 
European  championships)  and  culture 
(1988  Brisbane  Exhibition  followed  by 
the  1992  Seville  Exposition)  aimed  at 
“sensitising”  the  general  public  to 
Europe.  Additionally,  a  series  of 
“specific  campaigns”  were  launched  in 
1986,  culminating  in  the  declaration  of 
1986,  1987  and  1988  respectively  as 
European  Year  of  Road  Safety, 
Environment  and  the  Fight  Against 
Cancer.  Although  the  Commission  still 
placed emphasis on “information effort” 
and  “public  relations”,  European 
communication actors began to develop 
more  marketing-oriented  actions.
13  In 
1989,  the  Luxembourg  national  Jean 
Dondeliner, Commissioner in charge of 
Cultural and Audiovisual Affairs, as well 
as  of  Information,  re-oriented  the  new 
Priority  Information  Program.  As  a 
                                                 
12  The  biannual  standard  Eurobarometers 
(questions  on  opinion  “trends”)  have  been 
published  since  1974.  The  more  flexible  and 
more  targeted  Flash  Eurobarometers  were 
launched in the early 1990s. 
13  In  a  memorandum  on  the  activity  of  the 
Commission  in  the  area  of  information-
communication,  Anna  Melich,  then 
administrator  of  DG  Information, 
Communication,  Culture,  presented  these 
“marketing”  actions  as  “informative  spaces 
based  on  current  needs  and  instituted  them 
depending on circumstances” (Melich 1989).   
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result,  the  DG-X  was  able,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  establish  “information  and 
communication  guidelines”  among  the 
various units concerned, leading to better 
“coherence  of  resources”  in  relevant 
matters;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Commission  defined  “the  most 
important  and  most  appropriate 
Community issues”, and determined the 
use  of  resources  “depending  on  the 
Member  State  and  the  targets”.
14 
Contrary  to  the  retrospective  vision 
which  considers  the  very  controversial 
de-Clercq  report
15  (1993)  as  the 
beginning  of  awareness  to 
communication  within  the  College  and 
administration in Brussels, it is clear that 
issues  related  to  the  information  and 
sensitisation of the general public about 
Europe were major considerations as far 
back as the first term of Delors. 
 
In spite of preconceptions, an objective 
look at the communication machinery of 
the Commission can lead to consider as 
excessive,  or  even  unjustifiable,  the 
perpetual  retooling  of  this 
communication policy. The Berlaymont 
Press Centre, located in the headquarters 
of  the  Commission,  hosts  a  sizeable 
proportion  of  the  one  thousand  or  so 
accredited  journalists  from  all  over  the 
world  who  hold  daily  briefings  – 
                                                 
14  European  Commission,  Priority  Information 
Program 1989 – Operational Orientations, 1989 
(SEC(89)367/3). 
15 In 1992, the Commission appointed a group of 
experts  made  up  of  actors  from  various 
professional  horizons  (journalists,  academics, 
artistes, advertisers, and  national and European 
civil servants), and led by Belgian MEP Willy 
de-Clercq. The group was charged with a triple 
mission:  “establish  a  descriptive  state  of 
information  and  communication  policies”; 
“deliver  a  diagnostic  on  the  quality  of 
arrangements, actions, attitudes and means”; and 
“make  strategic  recommendations”.  In  spite  of 
the quality and extent of the elements of analysis 
in the group’s final report, the de-Clercq report 
was sharply criticised for referring to the Union 
as a “good product” (see de-Clercq 1993).  
referred  to  as  “midday  rendezvous”  – 
with  the  spokespersons  of  the  various 
directorate-generals of the Commission. 
Within  the  framework  of  its  press 
relations, the Commission also regularly 
invited to Brussels, at its cost, journalists 
from  the  local  press  of  the  Member 
States  in  order  to  explain  to  them  the 
work of the EU. “Europe” was equally 
present  in  each  country
16  through  the 
official  representation  of  the 
Commission  in  all  Member  States. 
Informative  literature  on  the  history  of 
the  EU  published  by  the  Commission, 
e.g.,  its  actions  and  various  programs, 
are  accessible  on  the  premises  of  the 
various  institutional  partners  like  the 
Europe  Information  Centre,  Europe 
Houses,  public  libraries,  and  Chambers 
of Commerce, which serve as its official 
relays; in addition to the role played by 
its own representatives and networks in 
the  Member  States
17  with  regard  to 
information.  Since  1999,  the 
Commission  has  its  own  website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/).  Redesigned  in 
2003,  it  offers  European  citizens  a 
stream  of  information  on  the  political 
agenda  of  the  EU,  the  Commissioners’ 
work  as  well  as  easy  access  to  a 
significant amount of EU archives (e.g., 
legislative  texts,  reports,  programs, 
organisational charts, forms, EU annual 
activity reports). For several years now, 
this  electronic  portal  has  been  hosting 
interactive  systems  which  enable 
European  citizens  to  directly  contact 
“Europe” in order to ask questions (the 
Euro  Direct  telephone  and  electronic 
contact  centre).  Furthermore,  “Europe” 
has  also  become  a  brand:  the 
Commission’s  logo  appears  on  all 
                                                 
16  The Commission has an official representation 
in  each  member  state  (sometimes  two,  as  in 
France  and  Germany).  The  staffs  of  these 
representations are under the Directorate-General 
of the commission in charge of communication. 
17  Close to seven hundred relays and networks 
including  the  four  hundred  new  Europe  Direct 
information relays opened in 2005.  
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programs,  aid  or  construction  projects 
for  which  it  provides  financial 
assistance;  and  on  beneficiary  partner 
sites  like  governmental  and  think  tank 
portals.  These  form  just  a  part  of  the 
communication  arsenal  that  the 
Commission possesses. 
 
Following the massive abstention in the 
European elections of 2004 and the “no” 
vote  to  the  constitutional  treaty  the 
following  year,  the  Commission  first 
responded  with  a  program  of 
consultation of European citizens aimed 
at  understanding  their  expectations  and 
opinions which, in turn, would inform a 
new  communication  policy.
18  A  few 
months later, the Commission offered to 
organise  the  entire  communication 
apparatus  more  formally  and 
systematically under its own structures. 
For  various  reasons,  however,  these 
initiatives met with stiff opposition from 
different  quarters,  especially  from  the 
other  institutions  of  the  institutional 
triangle (Parliament and Council) which 
had  their  own  information  and 
communication  departments;  and 
subsequently  from  the  various 
directorate-generals  of  the  Commission 
which,  since  the  1970s,  have  each 
progressively  set  up  a  communications 
unit  directed  towards  specialised 
audiences  of  their  policy  domain 
(Joana/Smith 2000). They all questioned 
not  only  the  attempts  to  centralise 
control  and  the  means  of  Community 
communication within the Commission, 
but  also  its  right  to  single-handedly 
manage  the  communication  of  the 
Union. Finally, they questioned the right 
of the Commission to speak on behalf of 
“Europe”
19.  This  resistance  and  these 
                                                 
18  European  Commission,  The  Commission’s 
Contribution  to  the  Period  of  Reflection  and 
Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate, Luxembourg, OPCE, 2005. 
19 The role of the spokesperson - defined as the 
recognition of the authority to speak on behalf of 
criticisms  signalled  the  end  of  the 
undisputed  leadership  of  the 
Commission  earned  in  the  1980s  and 
1990s. This situation results mostly from 
the  increasing  politicisation  of  the 
relationships  between  EU  institutions 
(linked to the extension of the scope of 
the Community’s action), correlative of 
a  misalignment  of  political  interests, 
among  which  those  of  Parliament  and 
the Commission. In 2006, there was no 
longer a single self-evident approach of 
European communication, as in the past 
when  the  focus  was  on  promoting  the 
European  “great  idea”,  explaining  its 
lines  of  action  and  legitimising  its 
institutions. The follow-up to the White 
Paper  points  to  the  ambiguities  of  the 
process  of  politicisation  of  Community 
communication,  both  driven  by  the 
imperative  of  legitimisation  introduced 
with  the  electoral  trial  and  subdued  by 
the logics of government by compromise 
specific to the EU (see Smith 2002 on 
this  point).  Imperceptibly,  the  long-
standing  principles  of  tacit  institutional 
agreement linking the Parliament to the 
Commission’s  orientations  have 
degenerated  over  recent  years  into 
systematic  criticism  of  the  College’s 
choices  and  proposals  on  the  part  of 
MEPs. Thus, in a follow-up text to the 
White Paper published in January 2007, 
this separation is described and justified 
in the following terms: 
 
Over the years, the European Parliament 
has critically examined the Commission's 
proposals in the field of communication. 
As  the  representative  of  the  interests  of 
Europe's citizens, it also itself has a duty 
to communicate what Europe is about and 
to  articulate  and  act  upon  citizens' 
                                                                     
Europe (and therefore in effect embody all the 
actors and institutions of the Union) and the right 
to  operate  its  symbols  –  results  in  the 
strengthening  of  the  dominant  position  of  the 
Commission. Concerning “the social technology 
of the delegation” and the effects of  “ circular 
circulation of recognition”, see Bourdieu 2001.   
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interests  in  Europe.  In  its  reports, 
Parliament has repeatedly made detailed 
proposals for improving the relationship 
between the EU and its citizens, although 
in many cases the Commission has only 
accepted  them  to  a  limited  extent.  As  a 
result,  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament have become very critical of 
Commission initiatives. However, there is 
no  dispute  as  to  the  fact  that  the  EU's 
communications  capacity  needs  to  be 
significantly improved.
20 
 
Tottering  halfway  between  polemical 
posture  and  acceptance  of  needs,  the 
ambivalence  of  these  words  at  once 
indicates the political weight taken on by 
the Commission and its narrow leeway 
in a decision-making space, based on the 
initiative  of  the  Commission;  and, 
traditionally, the search for compromise. 
In  order  to  make  allowances  for  long 
structural  transformations,  permanent 
inter-institutional  game  and  contextual 
effects,  it  is  useful  to  reposition  the 
mutation  of  communication  issues 
within  the  historical  plasticity  of  the 
European  Community.  While  the 
progressive  extension  of  the  field  of 
Community  communication  is  the 
consequence  of  the  changes  in  the 
institutional  representations  of  the 
“public” following electoral trials, these 
changes  do  not  only  affect  the 
improvement  of  the  techniques  and 
instruments  of  communication.  By 
shifting  from  one  paradigm  to  another, 
the  rationalisation  of  communication  – 
from  policy  of  Community 
communication to Community policy of 
communication - is a process that upsets 
institutional  routines  by  calling  into 
question the original distribution of roles 
and  competences.  The  centralisation  of 
the  Community  policy  of 
communication  in  favour  of  the 
Commission,  which  had  started  during 
                                                 
20  Fact  Sheet  on  communication  policy, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/4_16_7_e
n.htm. 
the Delors years, became more and more 
problematic  as  relationships  within  the 
European  institutional  game  got 
increasingly politicised. 
 
 
The  diffusionist  paradigm,  or  the 
political blind spot of information on 
Europe. 
 
When  the  Joint  Press  and  Information 
Service  (SPI)  was  established  in  the 
early 1960s at the behest of the European 
Parliament,
21  the  European  Project 
covered  only  six  States  and  only 
involved  –  apart  from  the  strategic 
production of steel and nuclear energy – 
the creation of a customs union among 
Member  States  by  1970.  Although  the 
rapid  progression  of  this  objective  and 
the considerable increase in trade among 
the  countries  that  signed  the  Rome 
Treaty bode well for enhanced political 
development that would eventually lead 
to  prospects  of  confederacy,  European 
communities still constituted an evolving 
legal  architecture  hinged  on  an 
embryonic  administration.  In  the  late 
1950s,  the  EEC  Commission  created  a 
special department for its relations with 
journalists sent to cover its activity. This 
spokesperson  department,  the 
Communication and the Spokesperson’s 
Service  (SPP),  was  soon  structured 
around  a  system  of  accreditation 
whereby,  in  collaboration  with 
journalists  in  Brussels,  officials  of  the 
                                                 
21  Considering  that  “the  three  European 
Communities  were  hatched  from  the  same 
political  idea  and  constitute  the  three 
differentiated  elements  of  a  unitary 
enlargement”, the Parliamentary Assembly on 27 
June  1958  adopted  a  resolution  which 
recommended  the  establishment  of  three 
common  services  including  a  “press  and 
information  service”  (JOCE,  26  July  1958). 
Difficult  negotiations  between  the  EEC,  ECSC 
and Euratom prevented its establishment prior to 
1962.   
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SPP  chose  journalists  authorised  to 
attend  the  Commission’s  press 
conferences (Bastin 2003). However, the 
exchange of information material on the 
Communities at the time was a reflection 
of  the  latter,  given  that  it  was  legal  in 
content  and  diplomatic  in  form.  It 
attracted very little media interest in the 
respective  States,  thus  making  the 
European  Agency
22  the  only  media 
house  providing  complete  and  daily 
coverage  of  the  Commission’s 
deliberations. 
 
From the Information Service to DG-COMM 
 
Successively  known  as  Common  Press  and 
Information  Service  (1968-1967),  Directorate- 
General  of  Press  and  Information  (1967-1973), 
Directorate General of Press and communication 
or  DG  X  (1973-1999),  the  administrative 
directorate  in  charge  of  communication  affairs 
within  the  Commission  in  Brussels  was  also 
temporarily the seat of Culture. It was dissolved 
by  the  Prodi  presidency  in  1999  (its 
responsibilities  were  shared  between  the 
Education-Culture  DG  and  the  spokesperson 
unit)  but  was  reconstituted  in  2001  under  the 
name of Directorate-General of communication 
or  DG-COMM.  This  directorate-general 
traditionally  managed  relations  with  accredited 
media houses, the activity of representations in 
the Member States, partnership with information 
relays as well as coordinating the publishing of 
major  information  and  communication 
documents  on  the  activities  of  the  EU.  With 
close to one thousand employees in the twenty-
seven  countries  of  the  Union,  the  organisation 
and effectiveness of DG-COMM have been one 
of  the  main  subjects  of  debate  in  each  of  the 
proposals – or other action plans – adopted by 
the  Commission  in  the  matter  of  EU 
“communication strategy” since 2001. 
 
  
                                                 
22   Founded  in  Luxembourg  in  1952 
immediately  after  the  installation  of  the  ECSC 
High  Authority,  Agence  Europe  moved  to 
Brussels when the EEC Commission took office 
in  1958.  It  played  the  long-term  role  of  a 
“European” press agency and of daily newsletter 
for “Brussels” information. 
Up until the 1970s, the Commission had 
no  communication  policy  stricto  sensu. 
The  dominant  perception  within  the 
European  institution  with  regard  to 
prospective  issues  of  communication  is 
embedded  in  what  we  shall  refer  to  as 
the diffusionist paradigm based on two 
approaches  to  the  problem:  the 
“ballistic”  approach,  or  choosing  the 
correct  channel;  and  the  deficiency 
approach,  or  filling  the  EC  knowledge 
gap. This translated into an information 
dissemination  policy  on,  for  example, 
“historical origins”, “the great missions” 
and the “initiatives” of the EU. Entrusted 
with this educational mission, the Press 
and  Information  DG,  which  is  the 
section  of  EU  administration  in  charge 
of  these  affairs,  limited  itself  to 
publishing a surprisingly limited amount 
of copies of brochures (about a thousand 
at  most),  and  sending  memoranda  to 
sections  of  the  public  such  as  trade 
unions  and  specialised  press  (Rabier 
1993)  who  are  directly  concerned  with 
Community  decisions.  In  1972,  MEPs 
adopted a report in which they severely 
criticised  this  concentration  of 
communication  towards  “specific 
audiences”.
23 In the report, the MEPs – 
who  were  then  still  delegated  by  the 
respective  national  parliaments  – 
accused  the  Commission  of  neglecting 
the  importance  of  communication  as  a 
channel  for  explaining  the  integration 
process to citizens and convincing them 
to  accept  this  historic  project.  The 
rapporteur,  Wilhelmus  Schuijt, 
bemoaned the relative decrease in funds 
allocated  to  communication  since  the 
creation of a single Commission in 1958, 
and  expressed  concerns  about 
interventionist  tendencies  in  the 
financing  of  projects  involving  local 
                                                 
23  Report  of  the  political  committee  of  the 
European Parliament on the  information policy 
of European Communities known as the Schuijt 
Report, January 1972.  
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partners.
24  In  the  face  of  this  critical 
assessment  of  their  activity,  the 
Commissioner  in  charge  of  the 
Information portfolio, Albert Borschette 
and  DG-X  director,  Jacques-René 
Rabier,  defended  this  sectionalised 
approach to their mission, which we will 
refer  to  here  as  a  public  relations 
approach.   Indeed, the  DG-X was split 
into  specialised  sections
25  with  the 
responsibility  for  drawing  up 
information  programs  targeted  at 
audiences  identifiable  mainly  by 
occupation.  The  responsibility  for 
publishing  dossiers  and  brochures 
detailing  Community  provisions  was 
given to external professionals who often 
turned  out  to  be  Brussels-based 
accredited  journalists.  Just  like  the 
diffusionist  concept  of  the  information 
missions  pursued  by  the  commission, 
this  organisational  model  remained 
essentially unchanged until the 1980s. 
 
From  Information  Service  to 
communication policy – facing the test 
of elections 
 
It was during the “Delors years”
26 that a 
gradual change of approach emerged in 
the  communicational  practices  of  the 
Commission.  This  change  was 
particularly due to the upscaling of the 
process  of  European  integration,  which 
considerably  increased  the 
Commissioners’  power  of  action  and 
                                                 
24 Ibid., p. 22. 
25 As in 1971, the DG-X was composed of the 
following departments:  Youth-Adult Education; 
University Affairs; Trade Unions; Economic and 
Social  Information  Group  (the  most  well-
equipped  in  terms  of  staff);  Agriculture; 
Industry-Energy-Scientific  Research; 
Development Aid; Foreign Relations and Trade 
Policy. 
26 Jacques Delors was president of the European 
Commission  from  1985  to  1995.  For  Delors’s 
push  towards  increasing  the  power  of  the 
Commission’s presidency, see Ross 1995. 
decision-making,  thus  concurrently 
transforming the conditions under which 
they  exercised  their  mandate.  This 
period  marked  the  passage  from  an 
economic  community,  which  was 
vigorously revitalised after the signing of 
the Single European Act in 1986, to the 
unprecedented  monetary  and  political 
unification  project  launched  with  the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
 
During this transitional period, the role 
of the Commission became a central part 
of  the  political  life  of  Europeans. 
Beyond  the  three  hundred  or  so 
directives  aimed  at  harmonising  the 
internal  market,  the  Commission 
emerged  increasingly  as  the  “European 
government”,  taking  on  roles  such  as 
negotiating  agreements  with  third 
countries,  and  reprimanding  Member 
States that flouted EU regulations. This 
was  especially  the  case  after  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  came  into  force, 
which  substantially  extended  the 
European  Union’s  sphere  of  activity, 
especially by establishing jurisdiction in 
matters  of  consumer  protection,  health, 
research,  environmental  protection  and 
immigration policy. 
 
The European Project of the 1990s was 
far more complex than that of the 1960s. 
It  covered  fifteen  countries,  forged  an 
integrated policy in the areas mentioned 
above,  and  further  developed 
intergovernmental cooperation in matters 
of foreign policy, common security and 
the  judiciary.  At  the  time,  the 
Commission  had  over  15,000 
employees. Nearly 800 journalists from 
Europe  and  around  the  world  were 
accredited  to  the  Commission’s  SPP. 
The mandate of the Commission became 
more political, leading to greater media 
exposure of their  activity  and therefore 
greater attention paid to their individual  
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and  collective  communication
27.  This 
politicisation  of  the  Commission 
gradually  changed  the  issues  of  EU 
communication  policy.  Although  still 
orchestrated by the Commission through 
the SPP, this customary jurisdiction was 
subject  to  debate  with  the  other 
institutions  at  the  same  time  as  the 
Commission.  The  result  is  the 
politicisation  of  the  communication 
strategy.  The  diffusionist  paradigm, 
which has always been dominant in the 
general  approach  to  European 
communication,  assumed  a  visibly 
strategic  coloration.  The  pedagogic 
justification  for  informing  “specific 
audiences” such  as farmers, academics, 
and journalists gradually gave way to a 
persuasive  communication  discourse 
aimed at the general public or at “target 
audiences”. 
 
Historically,  the  beginning  of  the  first 
shift  in  the  institutional  concept  of 
European communication and its reality 
can be situated at the transition from the 
1980s  to  the  1990s.  With  the  political 
revolution  initiated  by  Maastricht,  EU 
actors were no longer the artisans of  a 
customs union, economic integration or 
harmonisation  of  standards  of  member 
countries  only.  They  became  the 
entrepreneurs  of  a  model  of  regional 
democracy:  a  combination  of 
supranational  and  intergovernmental 
decision-making bodies, which emerged 
as  a  frame  of  reference  for  political 
regulation, i.e., the level at which public 
problems  are  defined  and  solved  in 
member  countries.  Beyond  the  powers 
delegated  by  the  representatives  of 
national populations and written into the 
treaty,  the  legitimacy  of  European 
authorities was henceforth to come from 
the  consent  of  citizens.  The  decade 
                                                 
27   After  1985,  the  commissioners  were 
more  than  before  key  political  figures,  having 
already  held  ministerial  positions  in  their 
countries. See Joana/Smith 2002 : 47-50. 
between  the  first  European 
parliamentary  elections  with  direct 
universal  suffrage  (from  1979),  to  the 
ratification  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty 
(1992-1993),  is  therefore  the  first 
movement in a new phase of European 
enlargement  in  which  the  decisions  of 
Brussels  would  be  more  systematically 
subjected  to  the  vote  and  judgement 
(e.g., opinion polls) of  the people. The 
support of citizens was now the primary 
condition  for  a  building  and  decision-
making  process  hitherto  confined  to 
diplomatic  circles,  and  to  negotiations 
between  executives  of  national 
administrations.  By  virtue  of  its  scope, 
this  new  “democratic  challenge”  –  as 
termed by the actors of these institutions 
– could only be overcome by means of 
relational  communication  sectionalised 
into public relations, media relations and 
lobbying, as well as confined to specific 
audiences. Resembling the governments 
of Member States, European Community 
institutions, especially the Commission, 
gradually  interiorised  the  public’s 
demand  for  democracy,
28  that  is,  a 
principle  of  legitimization  based  on  a 
permanent  link  between  policy  and 
current public opinion. 
 
From 1985, the Delors College put the 
issue  of  communication  on  its  list  of 
priorities  and  worked  towards  greater 
media visibility of the EC by means of 
“appropriate  and  selective  sensitisation 
campaigns  in  various  European 
countries”.
29  Following  this  new  and 
broadly  advertised  approach  to  solving 
                                                 
28 The notion was borrowed from Bernard Manin 
who  divides  democracy  into  three  successive 
ages,  namely  “parliamentary  government”, 
“party  democracy”  and  “democracy  of  the 
public”.  The  last  age  is  characterised  by 
personalisation of electoral choice, instability of 
political  preferences  and  the  weight  of  public 
opinion. See Manin 1995: 279sq.  
29  European  Commission,  Orientations  and 
objectives  1985-1988  of  the  information  and 
communication policy of the Commission, 1985.   
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the problem, MEPs adopted a report the 
following  year  which  declared  that  the 
institutions  must  “resort  to  the  most 
appropriate  means  of  communication- 
audiovisual,  press,  posters, 
advertisement”.
30  Both  in  the  MEPs’ 
report  and  the  Commissioners’ 
orientations, communication was defined 
as a distinct entity from information, the 
strategic association of a message and a 
dissemination  technology  capable  of 
influencing citizens. 
 
“There  is  an  information  policy  on 
Community policies. However it does not 
convey  messages,  only  news.  (…) 
Parliament is a symbol, and symbols that 
fail always attract negative feelings. That 
is  why  Parliament  has  the  political 
obligation  to  commit  the  States  of  the 
Community  to  a  policy  of  European 
communication within which not only all 
national  institutions  but  above  all 
Community  institutions  are  able  to 
express  their  meaning.  (…)  an 
information  policy  designed  without  a 
communication policy is a policy without 
raison d’être. No symbolic celebration, no 
festival, no prize, no sporting tournament 
can  fill  the  political  vacuum  created  by 
the  failure  of  the  political  idea  and 
structures of the Community.”
31 
 
It is during the 1980s that the perspective 
of  the  dominant  institutional  approach 
would change due to the test of universal 
suffrage and the increasing criticism of 
the  “democratic  deficit”
32  to  which  the 
EU was subjected. However, essentially, 
the  change  was  limited  to  applying 
advertising  techniques  to  EU 
institutional  communication,  as  the  “92 
market” programme, managed by DG-X 
and meant to promote the Single Market, 
shows (Tumber 1995). The shift from an 
                                                 
30  European  Parliament,  Report  on  the 
communication  policy  of  the  European 
community  (rapporteur:  Gianni  Baget  Bozzo), 
1986 (A 2-111/86). 
31 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
32  David  Marquand  first  used  the  expression 
(Marquand 1979). 
information policy designed to build to a 
communication  policy  designed  to 
persuade  is  only  an  adjustment  of  the 
response  model  to  the  problem  within 
the  limits  of  the  diffusionist  paradigm. 
The issue therefore was to find remedies 
to  the  loopholes,  vacuums  and  failures 
by  associating  the  professionalized 
techniques  of  strategically  generating 
and disseminating messages and those of 
the  “information  effort”.  The  original 
education-communication  model  now 
doubles  with  a  persuasion-
communication  model.  Henceforth,  the 
figures of the general public and opinion 
are part of the institutional language and 
vision  of  the  problem,  and  explicitly 
constitute  a  “target”  to  be  won  over 
using the recipes of mass communication 
and marketing.
33 
 
De-sectorisation  and  prioritisation  of 
EU communication. 
 
With the accelerated Europeanisation of 
the political horizon of EU countries in 
the  early  1990s,  the  leaders  of  the 
Commission,  including  MEPs,  took  a 
second look at the political role played 
by  the  information  and  communication 
work of the EU. The advent of European 
citizenship
34  would  compel  and 
authorise the Commission – even as the 
Member  States  were  still  suspicious  of 
“propaganda”  from  another  authority 
towards  their  own  citizens  –  to 
                                                 
33 This shift towards professional communication 
is not specific to the Commission and can also be 
observed  in  various  national  governments  in 
Europe. 
34  “European  citizenship”  was  created  by  the 
Maastricht Treaty (art. 8) in 1992, and sanctions 
the following rights: freedom of movement; right 
to vote and eligibility to stand for the Parliament 
in  Strasbourg;  right  to  vote  and  eligibility  to 
stand  for  municipal  elections;  right  to  petition 
Parliament;  and  diplomatic  protection  from  a 
Member  State  if  one’s  State  has  no 
representation in a third State.   
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reconsider the organisational modalities, 
means  and  objectives  assigned  to 
officials  in  charge  of  directing  EU 
communication. If the de-Clercq report
35 
stands for anything at all, it is surely the 
beginning  of  the  assumed  use  of  the 
instruments  of  communication  within 
Community  institutions.  The  general 
approach  to  the  problem  remained 
diffusionist,  that  is,  deficient  in 
conception  and  ballistic  in 
implementation.  Nevertheless, 
communication was now taken for what 
it is: an artificiality of institutional pose 
and  discourse  cleverly  presented  to  the 
public  as  natural.
36  Consequently, 
communication  towards  the  “general 
public”  was  considered  as  the  weak 
point  of  European  enlargement. 
Consequently,  it  became  a  veritable 
obsession,  regularly  revisited  by  the 
major  EU  actors  in  inter-institutional 
debates, reports and political forums in 
the media. The conversion to, as well as 
the faith in the power of communication 
were such that reference to it gradually 
innervated  the  publicising  of  the  major 
Community policies, such as presence of 
logos,  single  graphic  charters  for  all 
communication  supports,  and 
standardisation of message. The opinion 
surveys  sponsored  by  the  Commission 
identified  “sections  of  the  public”  who 
were less Europhile than others, namely 
young  people,  women  and  people  with 
lower levels of education.
37 In the face 
                                                 
35 de-Clercq Report, op. cit. 
36  Dominique  Memmi  analysed  the  work  of 
advisors  on  political  communication  from  the 
perspective of “maieutics of power”, or working 
to  “naturalise”  domination,  especially  by  “the 
pedagogy of poses” (Memmi 1991).  
37 This institutional reading by diverse Europhile 
“segments  of  the  public”  is  supported  by  a 
scholarly theorisation of which Ronald Inglehart, 
a close associate of the administrative executives 
of  the  DG-X,  (notably  Jacques-René  Rabier, 
founder  of  Eurobarometer)  was  an  influential 
figurehead in the 1970s and the 1980s. On these 
sociological  theorisations  of  membership  in 
Europe, see Belot 2002.  
of  this  problem,  communicational 
dialectics  provided  a  solution  in  that  it 
adjusts the message and the language to 
these “target audiences”, with the view 
to  “selling”  Europe  as  the  de-Clercq 
report  explicitly  recommended  as  early 
as 1993. It was no longer only a question 
of  designing  a  program  for  education 
about  Europe  by  informing  “specific 
audiences”  (Schuijt  report,  1979),  nor 
one  of  communication  based  on  the 
emotional  force  of  symbols  (Baget-
Bozzo  report,  1986).  According  to  the 
rhetoric  of  targeting  borrowed  from 
commercial marketing, the point was to 
draw  up  messages  and  mediatisation 
mechanisms  that  would  help  reach 
indifferent and ill-informed audiences. It 
is in this light that the development of a 
Community  audiovisual  policy,  the 
increase of aid for training and education 
and the information programs should be 
understood  (Eugène  2005).  As  early  as 
this period, the limited press coverage of 
European  affairs  and  the  absence  of 
genuinely  transnational  media  led  to 
move  beyond  a  model  of  public 
communication where the media are the 
prevalent  vector.  The  introduction  of 
marketing  instruments  ensures  that 
journalists  are  no  longer  “the  only 
audience  of  Europe”  (Baisnée  2000; 
2002). 
 
In  more  than  one  respect,  the  EU’s 
theme  of  “institutional  reform”, 
operating  in  the  soon-to-be  sanctioned 
concept of “European governance”
38 and 
later in the draft Constitution adopted in 
2004, was an expression of the desire to 
reconcile the general public and Europe. 
By means of successive adjustments, the 
institutional  reform  was  aimed  at 
simplifying  and  therefore  making  the 
decision-making process of the EU more 
                                                 
38  European  Commission,  White  Paper  on 
European  governance,  Brussels,  European 
Commission, 2001 [COM(2001) 428 final].  
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intelligible  to  a  maximum  number  of 
people. This teaching of the institutional 
action is supposed to curb the increasing 
abstention  and  mistrust  of  citizens  in 
“Brussels”.  After  the  creation  of  the 
Common  Market  (1986-1992)  which 
was  characterised  by  increased 
Commission  activity,  in  terms  of 
constraining  norms  for  Europeans,  and 
the passage to a political Europe with the 
Maastricht Treaty, it became imperative 
to  “democratise”  institutional  and 
decision-making  mechanisms.  The 
Maastricht Treaty immediately mentions 
that  the  “principle  of  representative 
democracy”
39  is  the  model  of 
institutional  design  of  the  EU  and 
consequently strengthens the role of the 
European  Parliament.
40  Within  this 
context  of  democratisation,  the 
intergovernmental  conference  charged 
with adopting the new treaty included a 
series  of  requirements  regarding 
transparency  in  the  decision-making 
process, and the legibility of Community 
texts.
41  It  was  followed  in  1993  by  an 
institutional declaration jointly signed by 
the  Council,  Parliament  and  the 
Commission; and held up as a necessary 
step forward for democracy which would 
promote  greater  transparency  in  the 
                                                 
39 Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, article I-46. 
40 Especially, for example, by codifying the use 
of the Commission’s vote of investiture and the 
introduction of a co-decision procedure (jointly 
with Council) in matters of legislation.  
41 Declaration 17 of the IGC (1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty)  amendment  to  the  TEU  states:  “The 
Conference  considers  that  transparency  of  the 
decision-making  process  strengthens  the 
democratic  nature  of  the  institutions  and  the 
public's  confidence  in  the  administration.  The 
Conference  accordingly  recommends  that  the 
Commission submit to the Council no later than 
1993 a report on measures designed to improve 
public access to the information available to the 
institutions”.  Declaration  39  emphasises  that: 
“The  Conference  notes  that  the  quality  of  the 
drafting of Community legislation is crucial if it 
is to be properly implemented by the competent 
national authorities and better understood by the 
public and in business circles”.   
decision-making  process,  as  well  as 
clarify  the  restrictive  conditions  of 
applying  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.
42 
The  formal  democratisation  of  the  EU, 
reinforced  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Amsterdam Treaty
43 did not produce the 
desired effect on EU public opinion. The 
mediatisation  of  the  scandal  and 
resignation  of  the  Santer  Commission 
(March 1999) appeared as the symptoms 
of a deep crisis of confidence in the EU 
both  on  the  part  of  the  elites,
44 
traditionally  considered  more  amenable 
to  Europe,  and  the  citizens  who  have 
been staunch opponents of Europe since 
Maastricht.
45 Even after its conversion to 
the  “science”  of  communicational 
marketing,  the  diffusionist  paradigm, 
like  the  action  model  that  extended  it, 
reached the limit of its effectiveness in 
the  face  of  the  EU’s  “democratic 
deficit”.  The  challenge  facing  EU 
communication  was  no  longer  only  a 
problem  of  popularity,  in  other  words, 
popularising  Europe,  its  history,  and 
actions. It was more a problem of image, 
or softening negative perceptions about 
the  EU.  Indeed,  public  perception  of 
Community action changed considerably 
in the period spanning from the Delors 
Plan  to  the  resignation  of  the  Santer 
Commission.  The  normative  nature  of 
                                                 
42 Inter-institutional Declaration on Democracy, 
Transparency  &  Subsidiarity,  Bulletin  of 
European Communities, n°10, 1993. 
43  The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  (1997)  meets  the 
urgent need to “democratise the EU” by adapting 
its  institutions  to  enlargement  and  “bringing  it 
closer  to  its  citizens”  as  inscribed  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
44 On this point, see Meyer 1999. Regarding the 
resignation  of  the  Santer  Commission, 
Georgakakis shows that the outcome of the crisis 
can  be  understood  in  terms  of  “external”  and 
“internal” factors. The weakening of the bonds 
between  the  Commission  and  accredited 
journalists,  and  the  distancing  of  MEPs  are 
“external”;  while  the  breakdown  in  solidarity 
between  the  commissioners  and  their 
administration  is  “internal”.  See  Georgakakis 
2000. 
45 See Eurobarometer 42, autumn 1994.  
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the  Commission’s  work  became  more 
important to people than its distributive 
policies  (structural  funds,  regional 
policies, CAP) (Scharpf 1999). Vilified 
endlessly by the growing mobilisation of 
Eurosceptics in public arenas, “Brussels” 
came to  acquire the image of a distant 
bureaucratic,  technocratic  and 
interventionist  “Hydra”.
46  Being  a  new 
phenomenon at the time, Euroscepticism 
made waves not only in electoral debates 
and  media  platforms,  but  also  in  the 
political  discourse  of  national 
governments. 
 
It was in this sombre atmosphere that the 
EU  communication  strategy  was 
redesigned  in  the  late  1990s  and  early 
2000s. The main principles of this new 
strategy consisted in greater accessibility 
to  information  on  Europe,  especially 
electronic,  and  presenting  Europe  as 
receptive  to  its  citizens.  By  investing 
heavily  in  Internet,  the  Commission 
opted for participative structures, which 
are  the  showcase  and  concrete 
manifestation  of  a  discourse  espousing 
the  virtues  of  open  and  transparent 
institutions  that  listen  to  citizens.  This 
new paradigm, which can be said to be 
procedural,  quickly  spread  throughout 
the institutional space of the Union like 
the new “European governance” and, by 
extension,  a  historic  movement 
considered  by  some  specialists  as  “the 
retreat  of  the  interventionist  doctrine” 
(see  Magnette  2006:  213sq.).  However, 
during  the  “crisis”  of  2005  some 
                                                 
46  Under  the  leadership  of  technocrats  with  no 
democratic  legitimacy,  the  Commission  was 
driven by a sheltered administrative spirit under 
the  influence  of  lobbies.  However,  the 
Commission  was  not  the  only  target  of  these 
constant criticisms expressed by the public. The 
European Parliament was also accused of being 
too  technical,  invisible  and  de-politicised. 
Finally, the Council was faulted for cultivating 
the art of secrecy, prejudicial to the principles of 
democratic  publicity.  See  Mazey/Richardson 
1993.  
protagonists  were  tempted  to  radicalise 
this  paradigm  by  extolling  the 
supposedly democratic  virtues of direct 
dialogue  –  with  neither  media  nor 
mediators – with citizens. Although this 
contemporary  communicational  myth  – 
whereby  policy  is  no  longer  a  rational 
process  of  agreement  among  experts 
(Neveu  1994:  31)  but  an  egalitarian 
voicing of opinions on public problems – 
was  able  to  seduce  the  current 
Commissioner  for  Communication,  it 
met with stiff opposition from the other 
institutional partners.  
 
(2) The inescapable “democratic 
deficit”, or the hypochondria of 
European communication:  
Rejection and accommodations 
of the procedural paradigm. 
 
Communicating to re-enchant Europe 
 
The  post-Santer  era  is  characterised  by 
the fluidity of the European institutional 
game.  The  Commission  was 
permanently weakened by accusations of 
favouritism, fraud  and  nepotism, which 
finally forced the Santer Commission to 
resign in March 1999 before the censure 
of  Parliament.
47  Although  the  latter 
undeniably  exerted  its  power  in  this 
unusual  confrontation,  its  action 
paradoxically remained dependent on the 
initiatives  of  the  Commission  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  the 
decision-making  process.  At  a  time 
when the various EU actors had to define 
the  rules  and  routines  governing  the 
                                                 
47 By the end of summer 1998, the Parliament 
was  debating  accusations  of  haphazard-  if  not 
fraudulent-  management  of  the  Commission’s 
contracts.  The  Community  executive  and  the 
European Parliament appointed a “Committee of 
Sages” made up of five independent experts who 
submitted an alarming report on the management 
practices of some of the Commissioners.  
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system  of  institutional  relations, 
communication became a sensitive point 
in  their  discussions.  As  part  of  the 
overhaul  of  the  Commission’s 
administration  recommended  by  the 
report  from  the  “Committee  of  Sages”, 
Romano Prodi dissolved the DG-X soon 
after  his  commission  took  office  in 
September  1999.  President  Prodi  took 
the unprecedented step of attaching the 
“Media and Communications” portfolio 
to  his  own  mandate,
48  and  shared  the 
responsibilities  of  the  erstwhile  DG-X 
between the SPP, which was in charge of 
Media and Communication, and the DG-
Education-Culture,  mainly  in  charge  of 
opinion  studies  and  publications. 
However,  this  administrative 
fragmentation  of  means,  staff  and 
interlocutors failed to satisfy the MEPs. 
An  alarming  rate  of  abstention  in  the 
European elections of 1999
49 was all it 
took for them to demand a more active 
communication that would re-assess the 
standing of “Europe” in the eyes of the 
general public prior to the switchover to 
the  Euro  and  upcoming  enlargement. 
More  than  ever,  a  new  communication 
policy appeared to them as the means of 
countering  the  indifference,  as  well  as 
the lack of interest in the EU on the part 
of Europeans (Meyer 1999).  
 
In  response  to  the  requests  of  the 
Parliament,  the  president  made  a 
commitment  in  Strasbourg  during  the 
parliamentary  session  of  spring  2000, 
that  the  Commission  would  adopt  “an 
information strategy” before the end of 
the year. However, as Prodi delayed in 
making good on his promise, in March 
                                                 
48  Traditionally,  Prodi’s  official  mandate  also 
covers  the  General  Secretariat  and  the  Legal 
Department, which are transversal sectors of the 
Commission’s administration. 
49  Voter  turnout  at  European  elections  has 
declined  steadily  since  the  first  elections  with 
universal suffrage: 63 % in 1979; 61% in 1984; 
58 % in 1989; 56.8 % in 1994; and only 49 % in 
1999.  
2001, MEPs adopted a “resolution on the 
information and communication strategy 
of  the  EU”  in  which  they  emphasised 
that  the  communications  strategy  of 
European institutions “must be urgently 
adapted”,  and  “note  with  concern  that 
the distribution of responsibilities in the 
information policy sector is considerably 
slowing the adoption of decisions in the 
said  sector”.
50  A  few  weeks  later,  the 
DG-X was re-established under the name 
of  DG-PRESS  (for  press  and 
communication)  and  given  to  the 
Portuguese  Commissioner,  Antonio 
Vitorino, who was already in charge of 
Justice and Home Affairs. Mr. Vitorino 
began his task in a tense atmosphere in 
which  the  unease  resulting  from  the 
crisis  of  confidence  in  the  Union  was 
further  worsened  by  the  Irish  voters’ 
rejection  of  the  Treaty  of  Nice.
51  As 
early  as  the  following  June,  the 
Commission  adopted  the 
recommendations made by the Vitorino 
team,  and  proposed  “a  new  framework 
of cooperation for  activities concerning 
the  information  and  communication 
policy  of  the  European  Union”.
52  The 
general spirit of this text was to redefine 
the  design  and  implementation  of  EU 
communication  through  greater 
involvement of various European actors 
in the information-communication effort 
of  the  EU.  The  Parliament,  and  its 
information  offices  in  the  Member 
States,  constituted  consultative  bodies 
(EU  Economic  and  Social  Council, 
Regions  Committee),  civil  society 
organisations,  and  political  parties. 
                                                 
50 European Parliament, Proposed Resolution on 
information  and  communication  policy  of  the 
EU,  8  March  2001  (B5-0174/2001).  Proposal 
passed on 14 March (2001).  
51  A  referendum  on  the  Treaty  of  Nice  was 
called in Ireland on 8 May 2001.  
52 European Commission, A new framework for 
co-operation  on  activities  concerning  the 
information  and  communication  policy  of  the 
European  Union,  Brussels,  European 
Commission, June 2001 (COM(2001)354 final).   
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Moreover,  even  States  were  duly 
designated  as  partners  in  an  “open 
framework  for  co-operation”  for  a 
“concerted  implementation  of  the 
information  policies  characterised  by  a 
management  that  is  light,  decentralised 
and the least bureaucratic possible”. This 
implicit reference to the new European 
governance that would be highlighted a 
month later in the White Paper
53 marked 
the  beginning  of  change  in  the 
institutional  framework  in  which  the 
problem  was  viewed.  The  diffusionist 
paradigm  gave  way,  albeit  without 
disappearing altogether, to a procedural 
paradigm  whereby  the  attitudes  of 
European  institutions,  and  the 
mechanisms  and  modalities  of 
interaction  with  citizens  appear  as  a 
sovereign  remedy  to  the  ills  of  Europe 
and,  by  extension,  to  the  gaping 
“democratic deficit”.  
 
Partnership  as  “good  practice”,  or 
communication  in  the  prism  of 
“governance”. 
 
In  many  respects,  the  Commission’s 
attempt to bring about general change at 
the end of the 1999-2000 crises, and by 
the  same  token  its  communication 
strategy, is placed within the modes of 
action  of  the  deliberative  shift.  In  the 
1990s, this turn gripped the institutions 
of political power in Europe one by one, 
obliging  them  to  experiment  with 
deliberative  mechanisms,  such  as 
neighbourhood  committees,  citizen 
juries,  and  participative  forums,  which 
gave  priority  to  citizens  and  concerned 
groups  in  terms  of  policy  decision 
mechanism.
54 Political sociologists, who 
have  carefully  observed  this 
                                                 
53  European  Commission,  White  Paper  on 
European  Governance,  Luxembourg,  OPCE, 
2001 (COM(2001) 428 final). 
54 On the introduction of these arrangements in 
Europe, see Sintomer 2007.  
phenomenon, link the implementation of 
these procedures to the emergence of a 
new principle of justification of political 
decision  and,  by  extension, 
legitimisation of official action supposed 
to  tackle  the  crisis  of  representation  in 
parliamentary democracies. This greater 
plurality of actors in the decision-making 
process  had  catchwords  like 
transparency, deliberation, participation, 
consultation,  listening,  forum  and,  of 
course, the concept-word of governance, 
which  subsumes  all  this  new  spirit  of 
public  action.
55  Although  an  earlier 
manifestation of this was to be found in 
the  1993  Inter-institutional  Declaration 
and in the theme of institutional reform, 
this  procedural  democratisation  was 
largely  put  forward  in  the  2001  White 
Paper on governance and in subsequent 
official  communications  by  the 
Commission  (see  Michel  2007).  Under 
the  progressive  influence  of  the 
Commission’s  senior  officials  and 
Commissioners from the countries with 
Nordic-style  governments  (Denmark, 
Sweden,  Finland  and  Germany),  these 
deliberative  mechanisms  were  factored 
in to the administrative, institutional and 
communicational  reform  of  the  EU 
(Georgakakis  2000,  Meyer  1999).  The 
sudden  enthusiasm  of  the  European 
institutional actors for these procedures 
that  promised  a  renewal  of  democratic 
life  was  the  result  of  several  years  of 
mounting  criticisms  regarding  Europe’s 
“legitimacy  deficit”  (Magnette  2003). 
Although in terms of democratic theory 
the analysis shows that the powers of the 
EU  are  limited  (especially  considering 
its  own  constraining  means)  and  that 
                                                 
55 This “new spirit of public action”, as termed 
by  Loïc  Blondiaux  and  Yves  Sintomer  (in 
reference  to  the  “new  spirit  of  capitalism” 
analysed by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello), 
is based on the idea of greater participation of 
non-political actors and ordinary citizens in the 
shaping  of  public  policy  and  decisions 
(Blondiaux/Sintomer 2002).   
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they  conform  in  all  manners  to  the 
principles  of  traditional  representative 
democracy  (Moravscik  2003). 
Governance as a concept helps procure a 
concerted  and  “civil  society-oriented” 
model  of  Community  decision-making. 
By  communicating  on  this  point,  the 
Commission sought to deflect criticisms 
about the technocratic single-mindedness 
plaguing  Brussels.  All  the  participative 
and deliberative mechanisms set up since 
the  1990s
56  were  characteristic  of 
flexible,  open  and  efficient  proximity 
democracy;  far  removed  from  the 
“Hydra”  of  Brussels.  In  terms  of 
“policy”,  the  Commission  proposed 
giving  concrete  expression  to  this  new 
cooperation  by  extending  the  scope  of 
action of the Inter-institutional Group on 
Information  (IGI),  where  political 
appointees  and  civil  servants  of  the 
Commission  and  Parliament  have  been 
cooperating  since  1995  in  defining  the 
priority  campaigns  of  the  EU  in 
partnership  with  Member  States.
57 
Established  for  the  purposes  of  debate 
and consultation, the IGI may in the long 
run  be  changed  into  an  “institutional 
information  agency”.
58  This  possibility 
of  externalisation  shows  the  EU 
government’s  tendency  to  divide 
decision-making  mechanisms  and  the 
institutional  (e.g.,  conflicting 
jurisdictions,  slow  pace  of 
communication  and  negotiation 
procedures) and political (e.g., the need 
for majority or super-majorities, pressure 
                                                 
56  The  Europe  telephone  hotline  (later  Europe 
Direct) was launched in 1999. It was portrayed 
as a “direct dialogue” for citizens and companies 
wishing  to  know  the  rights  and  opportunities 
conferred by the Union. 
57  PRINCE-  a  European  citizen  information 
program established in 1995 (but which extended 
the Priority Information Program initiated in the 
1980s)  and  subsequently  reserved  for 
enlargement in 2001, the Euro, the debate on the 
future of Europe and the creation of a new zone 
of freedom, security and justice. 
58 European Commission, A New Framework for 
Co-operation…, op. cit., p. 18. 
from  public  opinion)  constraints 
(Everson/Majone  2001:  139sq). 
Nevertheless,  although  the  Commission 
was  weakened,  it  reasserted  its 
institutional  prerogatives  –  and  by  the 
same  token,  the  more  limitative 
prerogatives  of  the  Parliament  –  in 
matters of communication. 
 
“The autonomy and integrity of all of the 
institutions is fully respected in the new 
framework.  In  particular,  the  European 
Commission is solely responsible for the 
communication and information activities 
relating to its exclusive authority, e.g. the 
right of initiative, the guardianship of the 
Treaty  or  the  execution  of  the  Budget 
under  the  control  of  the  budgetary 
authority.  The  European  Parliament, 
when  acting  in  its  role  as  legislator,  as 
budgetary authority or as the democratic 
control  authority,  must  have  full 
independence to voice its opinion and its 
members to speak freely on any subject of 
their choice.”
59 
 
According to the adherents of this model 
(which  could  arguably  be  called  an 
ideology)  of  decision-making, 
“governance  confers  the  double 
advantage  of  re-introducing  new 
principles  of  order  in  the  inter-
institutional  space  and  theorising  the 
modernity  of  European  democracy. 
Consequently,  official  communications 
referred to a “new institutional culture” 
and  a  “change  of  communication 
culture”,  while  endlessly  glorifying  the 
formula  of  “participatory  democracy”, 
which  became  the  order  of  the  day, 
sometimes  to  ridiculous  proportions.
60 
Explicitly based on five broad principles 
(openness,  participation,  responsibility, 
                                                 
59 European Commission, A New Framework for 
Co-operation…, op. cit., p. 5. 
60 Throughout the forty pages of the White Paper 
on  Governance,  “dialogue”  appears  18  times, 
“civil society” 21 times, “responsibility[ies]” 36 
times,  and  “citizens”  44  times.  Cf.  European 
Commission, White Paper on governance…, op. 
cit.  
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efficiency  and  coherence),  “good 
governance” prescribes “good practices” 
as  the  vehicle  for  conveying  this  new 
spirit  of  partnership  with  the  various 
associations  and  institutions  that 
represent  citizens.  It  is  therefore  not  a 
question of creating direct relations with 
the  latter  but  rather  of  initiating  “a 
systematic  dialogue  with  European  and 
national  associations  of  regional  and 
local  government  while  respecting 
constitutional  and  administrative 
arrangements”.
61 
 
On the basis of the recommendations of 
the  White  Paper  on  governance,  the 
Commission opened a debate in the fall 
of  2002  on  its  new  “communication 
strategy  for  the  EU”  project  by 
submitting  it  to  the  Council,  the 
Parliament  and  institutionalised 
consultative  bodies.
62  In  the 
memorandum  on  the  actual 
implementation of the project he sent to 
the Commission, Commissioner Vitorino 
states: 
 
“In order to succeed, the information and 
communication  strategy  of  the 
commission  must  be  determined  at  the 
highest political level and must be based 
on  political  priorities.  It  cannot  be 
deployed in the vacuum but placed on the 
contrary  in  the  framework  of  a  new 
culture  which  acknowledges  the 
importance of communication. By taking 
control  of  its  own  image  through  the 
development  and  broadcast  of  messages 
and the planning of related activities (…), 
the Commission will give itself the means 
for implementing the new strategy”.
63  
 
                                                 
61 European Commission, A New Framework for 
Co-operation… op. cit.  
62  European  Commission,  An  Information  and 
Communication  Strategy  for  the  European 
Union,  Brussels,  European  Union,  2002 
[COM(2002) 350 final/2]. 
63 DG PRESS, Memorandum to the Commission 
on the consequences for the Commission of the 
Information and Communication strategy for the 
EU, 2002 (SEC(2002)744/3), p. 7. 
To significantly encourage with “utmost 
coherence” the involvement of local and 
national  authorities,  the  Commission 
recommended  the  installation  of  “a 
common  system  of  reference  for  all 
institutions”.  This  consists  of 
highlighting  four  themes  that  would 
serve as a “vital lead”.
64 Fully anchored 
in the semantic universe of governance, 
this strategy is at the sole initiative and 
exclusive  responsibility  of  the 
Commission.  Nevertheless,  the 
Commission  systematically  consults 
political  instances  and  other  instituted 
groups  in  their  capacity  as  “partners”, 
i.e.,  actors  in  developing  the 
communication  policy.  However,  for 
reasons that will be explained hereafter, 
the  design  of  the  policy  in  this  area 
gradually turned into an arrangement for 
direct interface with citizens after 2004. 
This penchant for a radical version of the 
procedural  paradigm  was  quickly 
opposed  by  the  adherents  of 
representative  and  vertical  democracy, 
who  felt  their  traditional  role  as 
mediators was being questioned. 
 
From  participatory  turn  to  “radical 
transition” 
 
In  spite  of  the  frequent  disagreements 
that  have  characterised  the  inter-
institutional  discussions  on 
communication  policy  since  the  1960s, 
the Commission has always obtained at 
least the tacit support of the other bodies 
at  the  top  of  the  institutional  triangle. 
The  representatives  of  the  States,  who 
for  so  long  had  been  unwilling  to 
embrace  any  policy  directed  at  their 
                                                 
64 The virtue of exchanges (freedoms, diversity, 
humanism);  value added in terms of efficiency 
and solidarity; the notion of protection; and the 
role  of  Europe  in  the  world.  Cf.  European 
Commission,  An  Information  and 
Communication  Strategy  for  the  European 
Union… op. cit., p. 12.  
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constituents, quickly chose to maintain a 
vigilant silence over these issues.
65 The 
Parliament, which has always espoused a 
more  voluntarist  attitude,  as  expressed 
through  resolutions  (1981,  1993  and 
2001) or reports (Schuijt in 1979, Baget 
Bozzo  in  1986),  unfailingly  associated 
itself with the work of the Commission, 
endeavouring  to  influence  it.  In  the 
matter  of  European  Union 
communication,  there  was  equally  a 
certain  culture of  compromise resulting 
from the euphemisation of polemics and 
the glossing over of officially exchanged 
texts.
66  Over  the  last  three  years, 
however, this modus vivendi has given 
way  to  unusually  frank  exchanges, 
particularly between the Parliament and 
the  Commission.  After  the  record 
abstention in the European elections of 
2004
67  and  the  rejection  of  the  draft 
constitution by French and Dutch voters, 
the  Council  of  June  2005  invited  EU 
institutional  actors  to  a  “period  of 
reflections leading to a wide debate” on 
the  future  of  the  EU.  The  Commission 
was  given  the  mission  to  lead  a 
                                                 
65 This attitude of the Council (and thus of the 
Member  States)  towards  the  SPI  and 
DG Information-Communication  has  been 
explained  in  the  same  terms  by  several  senior 
officials.  Incidentally,  their  point  of  view 
confirms the testimony of J.-R. Rabier (Director 
of  the  SPI  from  1960-1967,  then  Director 
General of the DG-X from 1970-1973), when he 
told the story of his career to Yves Conrad and 
Julie  Cailleau  in  2004  as  part  of  the 
CONSHIST.COM program (Internal History of 
the European Commission 1958-1973). Cf. The 
Oral History Project, Historical Archives of the 
European Union, European University Institute. 
66  An  examination  of  the  reports  of  meetings 
between  principal  secretaries  explicitly  shows 
the  willingness  “to  render  some  wordings 
neutral”.  On  the  institutional  glossing  over  of 
texts, see Ollivier-Yaniv/Oger 2006.  
67 Abstention reached 60% in the older Member 
States  (54%  in  Spain,  57%  in  France  and 
Germany,  61%  in  Sweden  and  the  United 
Kingdom), and sometimes more than 70% in the 
new Member States (71% Czech Republic, 73% 
in Estonia, 79% in Poland and 83% in Slovakia). 
“mobilising  debate”  on  Europe  in 
Europe.
68 Very quickly, members of the 
new Barroso Commission responded to 
this request by adopting an Action Plan 
for  improving  communication  on 
Europe.
69  The  following  July,  the 
Commission  adopted  a  program  of 
reforms  aimed  at  professionalising  and 
decentralising communication services.
70 
In  autumn,  Commissioner  Wallström 
launched  a  series  of  debates  and 
consultations throughout the EU referred 
to  as  “Plan  D”.
71  The  goal  was  to 
redesign  the  contours  of  the 
communication  policy  of  the  Union 
through  participatory  debates.  In 
February  2006,  the  White  Paper  on 
Communication was published. Both in 
terms  of  design  (borrowed  from 
participatory democracy) and objectives, 
successive initiatives of the Commission 
                                                 
68 The terms chosen by the Heads of State during 
this  invitation  are  indicative  of  the  issues  of 
perception  of  the  institutional  framework:  “We 
have  noted  the  outcome  of  the  referendums  in 
France  and  the  Netherlands.  We  consider  that 
these  results  do  not  call  into  question  citizens' 
attachment  to  the  construction  of  Europe. 
Citizens  have  nevertheless  expressed  concerns 
and worries which need to be taken into account. 
Hence, the need for us to reflect together on this 
situation. This period of reflection will be used to 
enable a broad debate to take place in each of our 
countries, involving citizens, civil society, social 
partners,  national  parliaments  and  political 
parties.  This  debate,  designed  to  generate 
interest,  which  is  already  under  way  in  many 
Member  States,  must  be  intensified  and 
broadened.  The  European  institutions  will  also 
have  to  make  their  contribution,  with  the 
Commission  playing  a  special  role  in  this 
regard”.  (The  European  Council,  16-17  June 
2005, Brussels, Declaration on the Ratification 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the 
Europe, SN 117/05). 
69  European  Commission,  Action  Plan  to 
Improve  Communicating  Europe  by  the 
Commission,  European  Commission  (ed.) 
Brussels July 2005.  
70 Ibid. 
71  European  Commission,  The  Commission’s 
Contribution  to  the  Period  of  Reflection  and 
Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate, Luxembourg, OPCE, 2005.  
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decoupled the procedural paradigm from 
haphazard  experimentations,  thus 
making  it  the  basis  for  European 
communication  and,  ultimately, 
modifying  the  principle  of  legitimation 
of  EU  government.  From  the  Action 
Plan  of  July  2005,  there  was  talk  of  a 
“new  approach”  to  communication  on 
the  basis  of  permanent  direct  debate 
between  European  institutions  and 
citizens based on three principles: 
“-  Listening:  communication  is  a 
dialogue, not a one-way street. It is not 
just about EU institutions informing EU 
citizens but also about citizens expressing 
their opinions so that the Commission can 
understand  their  perceptions  and 
concerns. Europe's citizens want to make 
their  voices  in  Europe  heard  and  their 
democratic  participation  should  have  a 
direct bearing on EU policy formulation 
and output. 
–  Communicating:  EU  policies  and 
activities,  as  well  as  their  impact  on 
everyday lives, have to be communicated 
and  advocated  in  a  manner  that  people 
can  understand  and  relate  to  if  citizens 
are  to  follow  political  developments  at 
European level.  
–  Connecting  with  citizens  by  “going 
local”:  Good  communication  requires 
excellent  understanding  of  local 
audiences.  The  Commission’s 
communication  activities  must  be 
resourced and organised in such a way as 
to  address  matching  demographic  and 
national  and  local  concerns,  and  to 
convey information through the channels 
citizens  prefer  in  the  language  they  can 
understand.”
72 
The  plan  makes  apoint  of  specifically 
detailing  the  rationalisation  and 
professionalisation  of  communications 
activities within the various Community 
departments.  On  a  political  level,  the 
pivotal  and  centralising  role  of  the 
Commission  was  considerably 
                                                 
72  European  Commission,  Action  Plan,  op. cit., 
p. 3. 
strengthened.  The  Commission  thus 
showed a “single face” and facilitated a 
better  use  of  communication  tools  and 
services.  The  Commissioners,  who  are 
the  “public  faces”,  were  encouraged  to 
visit and communicate in Member States 
more  often,  as  they  were  not  only  the 
“main  communicators”  but  also  the 
“most  effective  communicators”  of  the 
Commission.  The  Commission’s 
representatives  (attached  to  the  DG  in 
charge  of  communication)  in  Member 
States were urged to improve their role 
as  “ambassadors”  and  “spokespersons” 
with  the  media  and  public  opinion.  At 
the administrative level, the fight against 
the  persistent  “fragmentation  of 
communication  activities”  demanded  a 
massive  reorganisation  of  the 
communication  machinery  of  the  EU. 
This  involved  the  true 
professionalisation of officials in charge 
of  this  policy,  i.e.,  their  access  to 
specialised  information  and  recruitment 
of  communication  specialists. 
Professionalisation also demanded better 
coordination  of  the  communication 
departments  of  the  various  DGs.  They 
therefore  proposed  that  the  DG-PRESS 
solely assume full responsibility for co-
ordination. It was re-named DG-COMM 
to “take into account the global character 
of the new approach to communication” 
and  “assume  the  new  responsibility”. 
This responsibility includes planning and 
assessment  of  the  EU  communication 
policy, in addition to its traditional roles 
of  analysing  European  public  opinion 
and  monitoring  the  media.  Under  the 
leadership  of  the  Commissioner  in 
charge of communication, the “group of 
Commission  members  in  charge  of 
communication  and  programming” 
defined  common  “priorities”  and 
“agenda” for communication. Equally in 
connection  with  the  development  of  a 
common  message,  “all  information 
relays financed by the Commission were 
placed  under  a  limited  number  of  
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regulatory bodies, sometimes one or two, 
depending  on  the  target  audience,  such 
as companies or the general public”.  
 
 
The  strengthening  of  the  co-ordinating 
role  of  the  Commission  was  in 
conjunction with the promotion of direct 
links  between  the  Commission  and 
European citizens. As seen in the Action 
Plan,  the  Internet  was  presented  as  the 
preferred tool of the new communication 
strategy.  Referring  to  Europa.eu,  the 
Internet  portal  of  the  EU  –  said  to  be 
“the world’s biggest public Internet site” 
–  the  plan  announced  new  progress  in 
the  electronic  interface  with  citizens, 
which  came  as  a  result  from  the 
appointment of an Europa editor and the 
creation  of  a  “news  site”.  Europa  has 
interactive arrangements which allow for 
accessing  personalised  information,
73 
expressing points of view on Community 
policies
74  and  accessing  the 
Commissioners’  personal  blogs. 
Europa.eu  was  portrayed  as  a  tool  for 
engaging  “dialogue”  and  “debate”  with 
citizens. Adopted by the Commission a 
few months later and presented as “the 
contribution  of  the  Commission  to  the 
period  of  reflection  and  beyond”,  Plan 
                                                 
73  Launched  in  1999,  the  Europe  telephone 
hotline - later known as Europe Direct- helped 
to  directly  solicit  information  from  European 
institutions.  Questions  can  be  asked  by 
telephone (the number redirects the call to the 
Commission’s  representations  in  the  caller’s 
country),  or  on  europa.eu.int/europedirect/. 
Eurojus is a similar program  meant for legal 
issues. 
74 In this regard, see the programs: Your voice 
and Interactive Policy Making, which are aimed 
at helping European institutions “understand the 
needs  of  citizens  and  enterprises  better”.  It  is 
intended  to  “assist  policy  development  by 
allowing  more  rapid  and  targeted  responses  to 
emerging  issues  and  problems,  improving  the 
assessment  of  the  impact  of  policies  (or  the 
absence  of  them)  and  providing  greater 
accountability to citizens”, (Europa.ec.). 
D
75 was designed to “initiate a wide and 
intensive  debate  on  EU  policies. 
However,  it  was  much  more  ambitious 
than a cycle of debates over Europe in 
the Member States and on the Internet. 
Moreover, the Commission described it 
as  “a  long-term  program  aimed  at 
revitalising  European  democracy  and 
contributing  to  the  emergence  of  a 
European  public  sphere,  within  which 
citizens  would  receive  the  information 
and  tools  they  need  to  actively 
participate  in  the  decision-making 
process and to appropriate the European 
Project”.
76  Thus,  as  part  of  the  direct 
consequences  of  the  principles 
enunciated  in  the  White  Paper  on 
governance, there is a clear link between 
interactive  communication  procedures 
and legitimacy of the political system. It 
is the radicalisation of this approach in 
the  White  Paper  on  Communication 
(February 2006), which drew opposition 
to  the  Commission’s  attempt  to 
concentrate  the  initiative  and 
management of EU communication. 
 
The black legend of the White Paper 
 
Originally  scheduled  to  be  released  in 
the autumn of 2006, the conclusions of 
the Commission on the responses to its 
proposals were published more than one 
year  later  in  October  2007.
77  These 
                                                 
75  European  Commission,  The  Commission’s 
Contribution  to  the  Period  of  Reflection  and 
Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and 
Debate,  Luxembourg,  2005 [COM(2005) 494 
final]. 
76 Ibid., p. 3. 
77  Published  in  February  2006,  the  WPC 
announced  a  six-month  period  of  consultation 
with official institutions and bodies, as well as all 
“interested  parties”  (“NGOs,  corporate 
associations”  and  other  “special  interests 
groups”)  through “a  series  of  consultative 
forums”. The White Paper stipulates: “At the end 
of this period, the Commission will summarise 
the replies and draw conclusions with a view to  
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scheduling  problems  explain  the 
reception  given  to  the  “basically  new 
approach”  to  communication  as 
proposed  in  the  text.  A  close 
examination of previous information and 
communication policies reveals that the 
White  Paper  on  Communication 
represents a paradigm shift both in terms 
of designs and practices of the past. The 
remote  hope  of  the  media  acting  as 
mediators of a transnational Europe was 
explicitly  jettisoned  in  favour  of  direct 
forms  of  information  based  on 
organisational  networks,  such  as 
representations and Internet services and 
portals.  The  Commission  equally 
abandoned the old dream of a European 
public  opinion,  replacing  it  with  a 
pragmatic strategy supposed to shape a 
“European public opinion” within local 
and national spaces. As a matter of form, 
both the arrangements and the formulas 
proposed  in  the  White  Paper  on 
Communication  clearly  demonstrate  a 
willingness  to  transpose  participatory 
marketing  technologies  into  political 
discourse (e.g., quality forums on brand 
sites, consumer blogs, and “one-to-one” 
communication).  This  is  similar  to  the 
introduction  of  commercial 
communication  methods  in  the  1990s, 
such  as  organisational  marketing 
methods,  preparing  and  broadcasting 
messages  in  the  mass  media.  Although 
the white paper was officially aimed at 
“improving  civic  education”,  it  views 
citizens  as  consumers.  As  such,  the 
political  supply  must  relate  to  their 
expectations, opinions, and behaviour.
78 
Based  on  the  observations  of  the 
Eurobarometer,  the  White  Paper  on 
                                                                     
proposing plans of action for each working area”. 
(WPC, p. 3). 
78  As  from  the  late  1990s,  and  more 
systematically  after  2001,  the  Commission 
sponsored “qualitative” opinion studies based on 
the focus group method. On the construction of a 
social demand through political instruments, see 
the introduction in Anquetin/Freyermuth 2008.  
 
Communication  considers 
communication  as  a  regulatory 
instrument that helps reduce the apparent 
paradox of maintaining on the one hand, 
positive attitudes vis-à-vis Europe; and, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  increasing 
abstention and mistrust of Europe from 
citizens.  The  novelty  here  lies  in  the 
highly  instrumental  conception  of  the 
propositions designed to “bring about a 
more effective participation of the media 
in  communication  relating  to  Europe”. 
Indeed,  the  White  Paper  on 
Communication  encouraged  public 
bodies  on  European,  national  and  local 
levels  to  “supply  the  media  with  high 
quality  information  and  current  affairs 
material”  and “work more closely  with 
broadcast  houses  and  the  media”,  and 
“create new links with regional and local 
communication  systems”  (p.10).  In  its 
desire  to  improve  upon  available  tools, 
the  White  Paper  also  proposed  the 
“modernisation  of  Europe  by  Satellite 
(EbS)”,  a  service  which  provides 
journalists  with  free  pictures  of  EU 
activities,  “with  a  focus  on  producing 
high quality audiovisual content which is 
user-friendly for the media and relevant 
to  the  citizens,  and  to  explore  the 
desirability  of  having  an  inter-
institutional  service  operating  on  the 
basis of professional standards” (Ibid.). 
 
In what constitutes a fundamentally new 
approach,  the  White  Paper  states:  “a 
decisive  move  away  from  one-way 
communication  to  reinforced  dialogue, 
from an institution-centred to a citizen-
centred  communication”.  Arguing 
incontestably that “peoples’ support for 
the  European  Project  is  a  matter  of 
common  interest”,  the  Commission 
states  that  “communication  should 
become an EU policy in its own right, at 
the  service  of  the  citizens”  (p.4). 
Furthermore,  one  of  the  strongest 
proposals  in  the  White  Paper  was  to  
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formally  define a single framework for 
EU communication: 
 
“The common principles and norms that 
should  guide  information  and 
communication  activities  on  European 
issues could be enshrined in a framework 
document  –  for  example  a  European 
Charter  or  Code  of  Conduct  on 
Communication.  The  aim  would  be  to 
engage  all  actors  (EU  institutions, 
national, regional and local governments, 
non-governmental  organisations)  in  a 
common commitment to respecting these 
principles  and  ensure  that  EU 
communication policy serves the citizens’ 
interest. This commitment would be made 
on  a  voluntary  basis.  The  Commission 
will launch a special web-based citizens’ 
forum  to  seek  views  on  the  desirability, 
purpose and content of such a framework 
document” (p.6) 
 
This proposal constitutes a double-break 
from  the  traditional  institutional 
compromise  of  European 
communication:  first,  because  it 
foreshadows  a  hardening  of  the 
standards binding the various European 
actors charged with communicating with 
the  public  and  the  media;  and,  second, 
because  it  imposes  the  principle  of 
publicity, giving citizens the possibility 
to  make  their  voices  heard  during 
interinstitutional  discussions.  The 
centralising,  restricting  and  “proactive” 
nature  of  the  Commission’s  proposals 
departs considerably from existing inter-
institutional routine and compromise and 
accounts for the severity of the criticisms 
levelled  at  the  White  Paper.  The  first 
reactions  came  from  journalists. 
Immediately after the presentation of the 
White  Paper,  the  president  of  the 
International Press Association, Michaël 
Stabenow, expressed his “concern” in a 
letter  to  Mrs.  Wallström  in  which  he 
pointed out that “the replacement of EBS 
with a news agency would jeopardise the 
distribution  of  our  respective 
jurisdictions”.
79  In  the  face  of  the 
massive criticism and disquiet caused by 
the  White  Paper,  the  DG-COMM 
quickly  posted  online  further 
explanations meant to be reassuring. In 
this  communication  exercise,  the 
questions  raised  by  the  officials 
themselves  are  an  indication  of  the 
general  upheaval  generated  by  the 
proposals of the White Paper.
80 
 
After  several  months  of  debate  by  the 
Committees,  the  Parliament  issued  an 
official  response  which  confirmed  the 
hostile  reception  given  to  the  White 
Paper in Community circles. MEPs have 
expressed  their  reticence  in  the  report 
submitted by the Culture and Education 
Commission and adopted by Parliament 
in  October  2006.
81  The  political 
importance of communication was made 
obvious through their recommendations, 
slightly  “rectifying”  the  logics  and 
                                                 
79  Cf.,  « Nouvelle  stratégie  de  la  Commission 
pour  expliquer  l’Europe.  Les  associations  de 
journalistes  reprochent  à  Bruxelles  de  vouloir 
compliquer  leur  travail  d'information », 
Le Monde, 5 février 2006. 
80
  Here  are  a  few  selected  questions:  Does 
action not speak louder than words? Is the term 
communication  not  just  a  new  word  for  EU 
propaganda?  Why  should  regional  and  local 
authorities make Europe known? Surely, that is 
not  their  responsibility.  The  white  paper  talks 
about  collaboration  with  the  media.  Does  that 
mean that the Commission wants to control what 
the  media  says?  What  does  the  White  Paper 
mean  by  “ modernising”  Europe  by  Satellite 
service?  The  White  Paper  talks  about 
a “charter” or “code of conduct” on European 
communication. Does it mean Brussels is going 
to impose new rules? Does the Commission want 
existing  media,  parliaments  and  educational 
systems  at  national  level  to  be  replaced  by  a 
“public sphere”?   
Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/communication_white_pa
per/question_answer/index_fr.htm.  
81 European Parliament, Report of the Committee 
on Culture and Education on the White Paper on 
a  European  communication  policy  (rapporteur: 
Luis  Herrero-Tejedor)  16  October  2006  (A6-
0365/2006). Hereafter referred to as EP/WPC.  
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rhetoric of the White Paper. First of all, 
the role of communication was put into 
perspective in relation to the effects of 
public  policies  themselves:  “…better 
communication  cannot  compensate  for 
insufficient policies but can improve the 
understanding  of  conducted  policies”, 
states the rapporteur who, “welcomes the 
Commission's recognition of the fact that 
communication  can  never  be  divorced 
from  what  is  being  communicated”,  in 
this  case,  the  policies  themselves. 
However, the MEPs’ tone quickly turned 
into one of warning, when they “urged 
the Commission to support the creation 
of a European public sphere” and not to 
leave  information  about  Europe  to  the 
exclusive care of local and international 
media,  but  to  work  with  them  “as 
intermediaries,  opinion-makers,  and 
carriers of messages to the citizen in the 
European public sphere”. In this regard, 
they  demanded  greater  efficiency  and 
less bureaucracy from the “myriads” of 
information centres. They also urged the 
Commission  not  to  overestimate  the 
participatory role of citizens with regard 
to  available  information  about  Europe, 
encouraging it to keep the programs and 
communication  support  which  convey, 
with loyal support of governments, this 
information to the citizens: 
 
“The idea of citizens becoming drivers of 
participation and dialogue does not seem 
reasonable,  since  it  is  not  citizens  who 
should  seek  out  information,  but  rather 
information  that  should  seek  out  the 
citizens.  (EP/WPC,  p.5)  National 
politicians  often  taking  credit  for 
European  success  stories,  while, 
conversely,  being  quick  to  criticise  the 
EU, often for failures in policy that arise 
at national level” (Ibid., p.5) 
 
This is a thinly veiled disavowal of the 
logic  of  participatory  democracy 
proposed by the Commission, and by the 
same  token,  a  preference  for  a  more 
functional  representative  democracy  in 
which each institution must preserve its 
independence  and  assume  the 
responsibilities  conferred  by  its  own 
legitimacy.    The  “code  of  good 
conduct”,  supposed  substitute  to 
legitimacy based on the clarification of 
the  “legal  basis”  for  the  information 
policy, was thus rejected. 
 
“The  Commission  has  proposed  to 
establish  a  code  of  conduct  on 
communication, that is to say, to draw up 
common  rules  for  the  European 
institutions, national bodies, and so forth, 
thereby  laying  foundations  on  which  to 
cement  communication  policies.  The 
rapporteur considers that this idea is not 
only  fundamentally  mistaken,  but  also 
undesirable  to  the  extent  that  it  would 
create  a  poor  substitute  for  a  genuine 
legal basis. In point of fact the European 
institutions  have  no  legal  basis  for 
Community reports given over specifically 
to information and communication. As a 
result the Commission too often lays itself 
open to the charge of meddling in an area 
outside  its  responsibility  or  even  of 
disseminating propaganda. The best way 
to  avoid  this  pitfall,  however,  is  not  to 
base a communication policy on a code of 
conduct, but to seek a unanimous decision 
of  the  Member  States  in  the  European 
Council,  thereby  affording  a  means, 
under Article 308 of the Treaty, to provide 
a legal basis in the full sense.” (EP/WPC, 
p. 12) 
 
By repositioning the problem within the 
legal  framework  of  inter-institutional 
relations,  the  EP/WPC  recalls  not  only 
the  independence  of  each  institution  in 
terms of communication policy, but also 
the  need  “to  enhance  existing 
mechanisms  for  inter-institutional 
partnership”. This is a very explicit way 
of criticising the functioning of the IGI 
and  reaffirming  the  need  for  the 
Commission  to  work  in  consultation 
with  other  actors  in  the  EU  decision-
making  process.    In  effect,  it  is  a 
confrontation  between  two  schools  of 
thought: on one side is the WPC, which 
supposedly  overestimates  the  role  of  
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communication  in  solving  the  political 
problems of Europe and encourages the 
promotion  of  participatory  democracy 
under the headship of the Commission. 
On the other side are MEPs who advance 
the time-tested virtues of representative 
democracy.  By  bringing  the  issue  of 
“legal  basis”  for  communication  to  the 
negotiation  table,  the  Parliament  was 
proposing  an  inter-institutional 
alternative  to  the  Commission’s 
normative  proposals.  In  many  respects, 
the  WBC,  by  virtue  of  its  formal  and 
public  nature,  re-crystallises  a  long-
standing point of disagreement between 
the two institutions; namely the concept 
of communication as a tool of political 
legitimisation.  Championed  by  elected 
representatives,  i.e.,  executives  of 
national  parties  well-versed  in  the 
territorialised  exercise  of  political 
mandate,  the  regulatory  vision  of 
communication as a vehicle of political 
consent
82 was a strange bedfellow of the 
procedural  approach  espoused  by  the 
Commission.  This  incompatibility  was 
all the more enhanced by the fact that, in 
radicalising  this  approach,  the 
Commission  tended  to  marginalise,  if 
not sideline, the role of traditional media 
and  mediators,  like  elected 
representatives  and  civil  society 
organisations. 
 
It is the same fear of relegation of civil 
society  organisations  which  underpins 
the criticisms expressed by the European 
Economic and Social Committee.
83 Both 
in  its  arguments  and  recommended 
solutions,  the  Committee’s  stand  was 
very  close  to  that  of  the  Parliament 
regarding  the  pursuit  of  inter-
                                                 
82 On “the institutional economy of consent”, see 
Gaïti 2006.  
83 Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee  on  the  White  Paper  on  a  European 
communication policy, 
Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union,  16 
December 2006 (2006/C 309/24). 
institutional  co-operation  and  the 
mediation work of the representatives: 
 
“The Committee, which strongly supports 
a decentralised approach, would urge the 
Commission  to  reflect  further  on  how 
genuine  synergies  and  interinstitutional 
cooperation  may  be  facilitated  at  the 
decentralised  level.  The  White  Paper 
states that at the end of the consultation 
period, the Commission will ‘present the 
results  of  the  consultation  and  then 
consider whether to propose a Charter, a 
Code  of  Conduct  or  other  instrument.’ 
The  Committee  is  concerned  by  this 
language  and  sees  risks  in  what  would 
appear to be the potential approach the 
Commission  might  propose.  The 
Committee  notes  with  concern  the 
Commission's launching of a special web-
based  forum  to  seek  views  on  the 
desirability  of  such  a  framework 
document. Not all European citizens have 
access to such a web-based approach. It 
would  be  essential  to  back  up  the 
consultation exercise through other, more 
traditional media.”
84 
 
The proposal making communication “a 
European  policy  in  its  own  right”, 
coupled  with  the  desire  to  establish  a 
“charter”, was tantamount to putting the 
Commission in control of the means, and 
the  driving,  of  the  communication 
policy; thus reducing the latitude of the 
other  partners  in  terms  of  being 
consulted and, in the case of Parliament, 
the  voting  for  the  budget.  The  quarrel 
over  the  “legal  basis”  for  the 
communication  policy  would  therefore 
crystallise opposition towards the WPC. 
Contrary  to  the  Commission’s  often 
repeated  claim  to  “exclusive  authority” 
on  the  issue  (linked  to  its  right  of 
initiative and to its role of custodian of 
the  treaty,  see  above),  MEPs  claimed 
that  the  sharing  of  powers  in  terms  of 
communication  has  never  been  clearly 
defined within the EU. A note posted on 
                                                 
84 Ibid. pp.1-2.  
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the  Parliament’s  official  website  in 
January 2007 read: 
“Legal basis for Communication Policy: 
Articles 21, 195, 211 and 308 of the EC 
treaty. Articles 11, 41, 42 and 44 of the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the 
European Union. The Treaty of Rome and 
the Amsterdam Treaty do not contain any 
particular  chapter  or  article  concerning 
communication  policy.  At  present  the 
EU's  communication  policy  is  based  on 
the articles of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights:  Article  11  (right  to  information 
and  freedom  of  expression,  as  well  as 
freedom  and  diversity  of  the  media), 
Article 41 (right to be heard and right of 
access to documents relating to oneself), 
Article  42  (right  of  access  to  the 
documents  of  the  European  Institutions) 
and  Article  44  (right  of  petition).  For 
actions  for  which  there  is  no  separate 
legal basis in the EC Treaty, a reference 
to Article 308 of the EC Treaty (extension 
of competence) is necessary.”
85 
For many months, the legal and political 
controversy  surrounding  the  “legal 
basis” of communication was the subject 
of  negotiations,  albeit  much  less 
publicised  than  the  Commissioned  had 
originally hoped. As a follow-up to the 
WPC,
86 the Commission published a text 
whose objective was to bring an end to 
the controversy
87 by drastically reducing 
the  number  of  proposals  made  by  the 
Commission eighteen months earlier. It 
was  a  shift  away  from  the  approach 
championed in the WPC, which consists 
of adjusting communication to the public 
through  a  “process  of  listening  to 
citizens” by means of local debates (with 
                                                 
85 Fact sheet on communication policy, available 
at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/4_16_7_en.
htm. 
86  European  commission,  Communicating 
Europe in Partnership, OPCE, October 3 2007 
(COM(2007)569). 
87  On  the  day  the  commission  published  its 
proposals  resulting  from  the  “consultation” 
around  the  WPC,  Commissioner  Wallström 
released a press statement titled, “Stop the Blame 
Game!”. 
increased  use  of  representations  in 
Member States), and qualitative opinion 
sampling  arrangements  and  studies. 
Although the earlier participatory streak 
still  features  among  the  “concrete 
proposals”  formulated  by  the 
Commission, the obvious objective was 
“greater  co-operation  and  collaboration 
between EU institutions; and bodies and 
the  Member  States  and  association  of 
these  partners  with  the  process  of 
communicating  on  European  issues”. 
The  inter-institutional  agreement  was 
presented  to  the  public  as  a  means  of 
enhancing  the  “co-ordination  of  the 
communication activities of the various 
EU actors” and, basically, the solution to 
the  conflict  resulting  from  the 
Commission’s attempt to regain control 
of  communication  policy  and  the 
common  means  thereof.    In  reality, 
though, it is a return to the principles of 
partnership (with institutions and bodies 
as  well  as  States  and  local  actors) 
adopted in 2001 and 2002 (see above). 
Basically,  it  is  an  extension  of  the 
PRINCE program, and the strengthening 
of  its  pilot  committee  (GH).  The  draft 
interinstitutional agreement drawn up by 
the  Commission  -  and  favourably 
received  by  the  other  signatory 
institutions  (Council  and  Parliament)  – 
signalled  the  decline  of  both  the 
centralising  pretensions  and  the 
participatory model initially advanced by 
the Commission. 
 
“1.  Information  and  communication  on 
European  issues  should  pursue  the 
following objectives: 
– To give everyone access  to fair and 
diverse  information  about  the  European 
Union; 
– To enable everyone to exercise their 
right  to  express  their  views  and  to 
participate  actively  in  the  public  debate 
on European issues. All public actors in 
the European Union have a responsibility 
to pursue these objectives, observing the 
principles of inclusiveness and pluralism,  
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participation and empowerment, openness 
and transparency. 
 
2.  While  recognising  the  different 
responsibilities  of  each  EU  institution, 
this  Interinstitutional  Agreement 
highlights  the  need  for  and  the  added 
value  of  better  coordination  in  the  way 
EU institutions and bodies communicate 
on EU issues. It provides a framework for 
coordinated action to this end. 
 
3. Together with the EU institutions and 
bodies, Member States have an essential 
role to play in disseminating information 
on  EU  issues  at  national,  regional  and 
local  level  in  order  to  reach  out  to  as 
many citizens as possible.”
88 
 
The  debate  among  the  major  EU 
institutional  actors  over  the  WPC 
between  early  2006  and  late  2007 
heralded the end of consensus over the 
aims  of  EU  communication  policy.  By 
proposing  to  break  with  inter-
institutional  routine
89  and  reinforce  the 
common  constraint,  Mrs.  Wallström 
distanced  herself  from  the  habitual 
transversal  role  (Smith  2001)  of 
Commissioners  in  the  institutional 
triangle
90  in  terms  of  preparing  the 
Commission’s  proposals.  The  epilogue 
to  this  intra-Community  conflict  marks 
the return of European communication to 
the  time-tested  model  of  European 
consensus,  akin  to  the  Co-decision 
                                                 
88  European  Commission,  Proposal  For  An 
Inter-Institutional  Agreement  On 
Communicating  Europe  In  Partnership, 
Commission Working Document, October 2007. 
89  A  few  days  before  the  presentation  of  the 
WPC, Heads of Cabinet various Commissioners 
had “withheld judgement” regarding portions of 
the WPC that  mentioned  “a charter or code of 
conduct”,  and  the  modernisation  of  EbS.  See 
Report of the special meeting of chiefs of staff 
on  January  26  2006  on  the  White  Paper  on  a 
European  communication  policy. 
(SEC(2006)129). 
90 Our sources indicate that top officials of the 
DG-COMM did not support the “coup de force” 
staged  by  Wallström  and  her  cabinet  in 
announcing  a  new  European  communication 
policy.   
Procedure. In its relations with the public 
in  Member  States,  the  EU  remains 
confined  to  its  “diffuse  democracy” 
(Lequesne/Costa/Jabko/Magnette  2003) 
perimeter,  compelled  to  compromise 
with  Member  States  and  actors  of  the 
European Project. In the EU, which is a 
“regulatory state” of European societies 
(Majone  1996),  the  weightiness  of  the 
logics of compromise has imperceptibly 
prevailed  over  the  Commission’s 
attempts  to  make  a  Community  policy 
out of communication, and confined its 
competences  in  that  field  to  the  co-
ordination of the respective interests of 
EU institutions. 
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